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Abstract
In this article, we analyse the interactions between financial and start-up decisions in an
oligopolistic framework, where firms compete to enter a new market. We show that
preemption can substantially reduce the negative effects of credit rationing on start-up
investment decisions.
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It is a well-known fact that start-up ￿rms usually fear that a rival may seize
their business advantage by moving ￿rst. This entails the possibility that the
￿rm￿ s project value is sharply reduced by potential competitors. Another
important feature of start-ups is the limited access to external sources.1 As
far as we know, however, only a few papers have studied the interaction
between entry decisions and capital structure.
In this paper we therefore look at the e⁄ects of limited access to exter-
nal ￿nance on start-up investments. Using an oligopolistic framework with
preemption and incomplete information, we will then compare an all-equity-
￿nancing setup with a benchmark optimal leverage one. The former entails
a 100% credit constraint, whereas the latter implies full ￿nancial ￿ exibility.
This paper is linked to two streams of literature. The ￿rst concerns real
options and market structure. As start-ups can be optimally timed, option
pricing techniques are a useful tool to analyse these decisions.2 Furthermore,
since the second half of the 90s there has been a growing interest in inte-
grating strategic considerations with option pricing techniques.3 Most of the
published articles, however, assume complete information: this is clearly un-
satisfactory in the case of start-ups, where information on the characteristics
and behaviour of competitors is scarce. A notable exception is Lambrecht and
Perraudin (2003) (hereafter LP), who studied the interactions between entry
decisions and preemption in a duopoly model with incomplete information.4
However, they assumed that ￿rms are all equity-￿nanced.5
The second line of research is the one on optimal capital structure. As
1One relevant exception were internet stocks whose hypervaluation led to a relatively
easy access to external ￿nance (see e.g. Ottoo, 2001).
2This is one of the main contributions of the real-option theory, which basically says
that "when the future is highly uncertain, it pays to have a broad range of options open"
(Coy, 1999). Graham and Harvey (2001) show that about 25% of the companies surveyed
always or almost always incorporate real options when evaluating a project. Furthermore,
McDonald (2000) and Jagannathan and Meter (2002) argue that even when ￿rms use
standard techniques, they may apply ad hoc rules of thumb which proxy for optimal
timing behaviour.
3See e.g. the books by Huisman (2001) and Smit and Trigeorgis (2004).
4Other exceptions are Grenadier (2002) for the Cournot-oligopolist case, and Moretto
(2000), Dosi and Moretto (2007) for the second-mover advantage.
5Lambrecht (2001) analyses the impact of debt ￿nancing in a real option leader-follower
model. However he assumes full information.
1we know, debt ￿nancing entails both costs and bene￿ts. On the one hand,
debt may lead to bankruptcy and agency con￿ icts between shareholders and
debtholders. On the other hand, debt not only ensures relevant tax bene￿ts
(Leland, 1994) but can also reduce agency con￿ icts between managers and
shareholders (Jensen, 1986). Under such a model, therefore, ￿rms choose
their capital structure optimally, by weighing the costs and bene￿ts of debt
￿nancing. It is worth noting however that most existing papers do not con-
sider how strategic behaviour may a⁄ect a ￿rm￿ s capital structure choice.6
In this article, we aim to provide a natural extension of these studies,
by analysing the interactions between ￿nancial and start-up decisions in an
oligopolistic framework with preemption, where ￿rms compete to enter a new
market. We will prove that preemption makes all-equity-￿nanced investment
strategies closer to those undertaken under optimal leverage. This means
that preemption can substantially reduce the discouraging e⁄ects of credit
rationing on start-up investment decisions.
The article is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Sec-
tion 3 studies the interactions between ￿nancial and real choices. Section 4
concludes.
2 The model
Let us focus on an oligopolistic market where N + 1 (N > 0) ￿rms compete
under the fear of preemption. To exploit new market opportunities, each ￿rm
must pay a sunk cost In, n 2 N+1. Risk is fully diversi￿able and the risk-free
interest rate r is given. By assumption, if one of the ￿rms invests, the others
lose any opportunity to invest.7 Once investment is undertaken, the project
cannot be abandoned, although the ￿rm￿ s operation can be temporarily and
costlessly suspended when its payo⁄ falls to zero (see Dixit and Pindyck,
1994).
The ￿rms￿payo⁄s ￿t evolve according to the following geometric Brown-
ian motion
d￿t = (r ￿ ￿)￿tdt + ￿￿tdzt; with ￿0 = ￿, (1)
6Exceptions are Mauer and Ott (2000) and Miao (2005). However, they do not model
the threat of preemption.
7In this article we assume that no incumbent exists. However, the quality of results
would not change if we assumed a leader-follower setup. For details on this point, see
Moretto (2000).
2where ￿ ￿ 0 is the net ￿dividend￿ yield (see e.g. McDonald and Siegel,
1985), ￿ is the instantaneous standard deviation and dzt is the increment of
a standard Wiener process.
Following LP we assume that In is the ￿rm n￿ s private information. At
each instant, ￿rm n observes the realisation of the state variable ￿t; and,
according to its private information on In and its conjectures on the rivals￿
strategies, it decides whether to invest or not.8 This entails an optimal
stopping time decision where ￿rm n invests if its payo⁄ ￿t reaches a trigger
value ￿ ￿n; above which investment is pro￿table. Since ￿ ￿n depends on In; it
is private information as well.9 To determine a ￿rm￿ s investment strategies,
we also assume that ￿ ￿n is drawn from the conditional distribution function
Fn(￿ ￿n;￿); with a continuous di⁄erentiable density fn(￿ ￿n;￿) on the support
[￿ ￿l; ￿ ￿u):10 With no loss of generality, we also assume Fn = F; 8n 2 N + 1:
As time passes, ￿t is expected to rise. If, therefore, competitors have not
yet invested, each ￿rm learns that its rivals￿trigger points lie in a smaller
higher interval. A su¢ cient statistic that captures this information is given
by Ut = sup0￿s<t(￿s) which denotes the maximum level of payo⁄ up to time
t without one of the ￿rms having invested. This means that, at any instant
t ￿ 0, each ￿rm updates its conditional distribution of the rivals￿trigger
values according to Bayes￿rule
Ft(￿ ￿;Ut) =
F(￿ ￿;￿) ￿ F(Ut;￿)
1 ￿ F(Ut;￿)
where U0 = ￿; (2)
which is strictly increasing in the [Ut; ￿ ￿u) interval. Given (2), a ￿rm learns
by observing its rivals￿behaviour. This leads to a Bayesian Nash equilibrium,
consisting of N + 1 linked ￿stopping time problems￿ , where each ￿rm solves
its own investing problem, conditional on rivals￿actions. If, therefore, no
competitor has yet invested, the game goes on; otherwise, it ends up.11
8Notice that the quality of results does not change if we assume incomplete information
on ￿rm-speci￿c pro￿tability.
9As shown by LP, asymmetric information on costs results in the optimal trigger value
￿ ￿n being, under the same regularity condition, a unique continuous increasing mapping
function of In, i.e., ￿ ￿n = ￿ ￿(In) with
@￿ ￿n(In)
@In > 0:
10We assume that ￿ ￿n does not have any mass at ￿, but it does have positive density
there. Therefore, the set
￿￿ ￿n j fn(￿ ￿n;￿) > 0
￿
￿ [￿ ￿l; ￿ ￿u) has a density function with
positive support for ￿ ￿l ￿ ￿ and ￿ ￿u ￿ 1. For further details see LP.
11With no loss of generality, we assume that if all ￿rms invest simultaneously, each ￿rm
has a probability 1=(N + 1) of winning the race.
3Let us ￿nally focus on the capital structure. In order to measure the
e⁄ects of debt constraint, we will compare the all-equity-￿nancing case, where
￿rms cannot borrow, with a trade-o⁄case where leverage is optimally chosen.
For simplicity, we assume no debt renegotiation.
Following Leland (1994), we de￿ne C as the coupon paid to debtholders
and assume that the bene￿t from debt ￿nancing is proportional to the coupon
paid, i.e. "C with " > 0: Moreover, we assume that default takes place when
￿t drops to C.12 In this case, equityholders are expropriated by lenders.
Such an expropriation causes a sunk cost ￿C with ￿ > 0.13
3 The ￿rms￿decisions
If real and ￿nancial decisions are made simultaneously, the ￿rm￿ s objective
function is equal to the maximum between zero and its option to invest. The
￿rm n￿ s problem at time t ￿ 0 is thus one of choosing the optimal entry
trigger ￿ ￿n and the coupon C, namely,
On(￿t;Ut; ￿ ￿n;C) = max
￿ ￿n>0;C>0
￿




where Vn(￿t; ￿ ￿n;C) is the option to invest for a given trigger ￿ ￿n: When
￿rms can borrow, Vn(￿t; ￿ ￿n;C) is equal to the sum of the equity value,
called En (￿t;C); and the value of debt, i.e., Dn (￿t;C).
The term Pr(Tn < TN￿n j Ut) measures the probability that ￿rm n
moves ￿rst. Instant Tn = inf(t > 0 j ￿t = ￿ ￿n) is the expected stopping




; i 2 N + 1) is the minimum investment timing of its
N competitors. Assuming that each ￿rm￿ s investment trigger is indepen-
dently distributed, and applying rule (2), we obtain Pr(Tn < TN￿n j Ut) =
[1 ￿ F(￿ ￿n;￿t)=1 ￿ F(Ut;￿t)]N. Given these assumptions we can show that:
12This results in debt being protected (see Leland, 1994). However, the quality of results
does not change if we assume that debt is unprotected, i.e., that equityholders can choose
when to default.
13This cost may be justi￿ed by the fact that not only default procedures are per se costly
and time-consuming but also by the fact that the law may make it di¢ cult for lenders to
repossess collateral (see e.g. Panteghini, 2007a).



































n ;￿) is the hazard rate, with ￿1 > 1 and ￿2 < 0. The
optimal ratio between C and ￿ ￿D














Proof. See Appendix A.
Proposition 1 shows the joint e⁄ect of preemption and leverage on a ￿rm￿ s
strategies, and thus it is an extension of previous work in two respects. On
the one hand, the introduction of debt-￿nancing allows us to generalise LP￿ s
￿ndings. On the other hand, the introduction of preemption also improves
Mello and Parsons (1992) and Gamba et al. (2005). In particular, (4) shows




: it is easy to show





The e⁄ect of leverage on investment decisions is measured by the term
1
1+m < 1. It is clear that @m
@" > 0 and @m
@￿ < 0. This means that the greater
the bene￿t of borrowing ("),15 the lower the ￿rm￿ s trigger point, i.e., the
greater the ￿rm￿ s propensity to invest at any given time. The reverse is true
when the cost of default is accounted for. In this case, the greater the ￿; the
lower the propensity to invest. Moreover, as shown in (5), the ratio C=￿ ￿D
n is
una⁄ected by the number of competing ￿rms.
Let us next focus on the preemption hazard rate, that is, the likelihood of
an event occurring in the next instant, given that the event has not occurred
up to that time. In (4) the hazard rate measures the likelihood of the ￿rm
n investing at ￿ ￿D
n . Notice that h(￿ ￿D
n ;N) is nil when there is no probability
of one ￿rm going ￿rst, i.e., under monopoly (N = 0). On the other hand,
14As shown in (3) and (4), the ￿rm￿ s option to invest depends on ￿t: On the contrary,
the threshold point ￿ ￿D
n is una⁄ected by current pro￿tability, because the hazard-rate
h(￿ ￿D
n ;N) is independent of both ￿t and Ut (see Appendix A).
15Remember that " usually embodies tax bene￿ts. For further details on this point see
e.g., Panteghini (2007a, 2007b).
5it goes to in￿nity under perfect competition (i.e., when N ! 1).16 In the





the latter case, the competitive (zero-NPV) trigger point is equal to ￿ ￿D
NPV =
1
1+m￿In. Given Proposition 1 we can thus write the following:
Corollary 1 If h(￿ ￿D
n ;N) 2 [0;1); we have ￿ ￿D
NPV ￿ ￿ ￿D
n ￿ ￿ ￿D 8n; where
upper bound is reached as h(￿ ￿D
n ;N) ! 0, and the lower bound is obtained as
h(￿ ￿D
n ;N) ! 1:
Corollary 1 shows that the oligopolistic trigger point lies between the
competitive (zero-NPV) and the monopolistic one. This Corollary will be
necessary to compare the trade-o⁄ case, depicted in Proposition 1, with the
all-equity ￿nancing one, that we are going to study. Setting C = 0 into (4),









By Corollary 1, it is clear that if h(￿ ￿E
n;N) 2 [0;1), the optimal investment
strategy under all-equity lies between the competitive trigger point and the
monopolistic one, i.e. ￿ ￿E
NPV ￿ ￿ ￿E
n ￿ ￿ ￿E 8n, where ￿ ￿E
NPV = ￿In and
￿ ￿E =
￿1
￿1￿1￿In. Therefore, we can prove that:








￿ ￿E : (7)
Proof. See Appendix B.




n is the result of two o⁄setting e⁄ects. On the one
hand, optimal leverage makes the project more pro￿table, thereby encourag-
ing investment. On the other hand, ￿nancial ￿ exibility raises the opportunity
cost of investment, thus causing a delay. Proposition 2 shows that the for-
mer e⁄ect always dominates the latter: this means that ￿nancial ￿ exibility
stimulates investment, i.e., ￿ ￿D








￿ ￿E states that the ratio between the trade-
o⁄ and the equity-￿nanced trigger point under preemption is greater than
16Notice that the hazard rate goes to in￿nity also when Ut goes to ￿ ￿u. As Ut ! ￿ ￿u
and no ￿rms have invested yet, each ￿rm knows that at least one of its rivals will almost
certainly act in the near future. This causes the hazard rate to explode (see LP).
6that obtained under monopoly (N = 0). This results in preemption reduc-
ing the di⁄erence between the investment strategies in the two cases under
study. The reasoning behind this result is as follows. As shown by (5) the
ratio C=￿ ￿D
n is una⁄ected by strategic interactions. This implies that, under
preemption, a decrease in the trigger value causes a proportional decrease in
the optimal coupon C and, consequently, the ￿rms borrow a lower amount
of debt. Since the incentive to borrow is reduced by preemption, the dif-
ference between the all-equity-￿nanced and the trade-o⁄ case is smaller. In
short, Proposition 2 shows that the discouraging e⁄ect of credit rationing on
investment decisions is reduced by preemption.
4 Concluding remarks
In this article, we have provided an natural extension of existing studies,
by analysing the interactions between ￿nancial and start-up decisions, in an
oligopolistic market. Moreover, by comparing an all-equity-￿nancing setup
with a benchmark optimal leverage one, under incomplete information, we
have analysed the e⁄ects of credit constraints on a start-up￿ s investment
strategy. As we have shown, an all-equity-￿nanced new venture is postponed
with respect to an optimally leveraged one (Proposition 1). However, we
have also proven that preemption reduces the incentive to borrow. This
means that, in a realistic setting where start-up ￿rms compete to enter a new
market, the discouraging e⁄ect of credit rationing on investment decision is
reduced (Proposition 2). These results allow us to state that, as long as
preemption exists, a limited access to credit may have negligible e⁄ects on a
start-up￿ s propensity to invest.
7A Proof of Proposition 1
To prove this Proposition, let us ￿rst calculate the ￿rm￿ s value function. For
simplicity we set t = 0 and, hereafter, omit the time variable. Let us de￿ne
En (￿;C) as the market value of the equity. Following Leland (1994), its
contingent claim valuation can be derived as the solution of the following
equation:















r + A1￿￿1 + A2￿￿2 if ￿ 2 (C;1);
(9)
where ￿1 > 0 and ￿2 < 0 are the roots of the characteristic equation ￿(￿) ￿
1
2￿2￿(￿ ￿ 1) + (r ￿ ￿)￿ ￿ r = 0:
Let us next calculate the constants A1 and A2: In the absence of any
￿nancial bubbles, A1 is nil. The term A2￿￿2 measures the expected present
value of the payo⁄lost after default. To calculate A2, we apply the boundary
condition En (C;C) = 0; which states that the value of equity is nil when




















C if ￿ 2 (C;1):
(10)
Let us next calculate the value of debt. Similarly to equity, debt must satisfy
the following di⁄erential equation:











￿ + B1￿￿1 + B2￿￿2 if ￿ 2 [0;C);
C
r + D1￿￿1 + D2￿￿2 if ￿ 2 (C;1):
(12)
8If the operation can be suspended when ￿ falls to zero, we have Dn (0;C) =
0 and the boundary condition B2 = 0 is obtained: In the absence of any
￿nancial bubble, moreover, we must also have B1 = D1 = 0: Finally, D2 can
be calculated by setting the two branches of (12), net of the default cost ￿C;



















C if ￿ 2 (C;1):
(13)
Recalling (3) we must evaluate:





























where Wn(￿ ￿n;C) is ￿rm n￿ s static project value for ￿ = ￿ ￿n. Adding (10) to
























. Substituting (15) and (16) into (3) we obtain

























17For further details on these boundary conditions see e.g. Panteghini (2007a).
















(1 ￿ F(￿ ￿n;￿;U))
N:




￿1 + h(￿ ￿D
n ;N)







C 8 n; (20)
with h(￿ ￿n;N) ￿
N ￿ ￿nf(￿ ￿n;￿)
1￿F(￿ ￿n;￿) , and the ratio (5).
Substituting (5) into (20) we obtain the investment trigger point (4):
￿ ￿
D






(￿1 ￿ 1)(￿1 ￿ 1 + h(￿ ￿D
n ;N))
















n ;N): Note that, given (2), the hazard rate is
una⁄ected by downward truncations of the distribution F(￿ ￿n;￿); i.e.,
h(￿ ￿n;N) =
N ￿ ￿nft(￿ ￿n;Ut)
1 ￿ Ft(￿ ￿n;Ut)
=
N ￿ ￿nf(￿ ￿n;￿)
1 ￿ F(￿ ￿n;￿)
; (22)
This makes the optimal operating rule (4) stationary. Proposition 1 is thus
proven.￿




@(￿ ￿n)2 < 0 to hold is that h(￿ ￿D
n ;N) is increasing in ￿ ￿D
n : The
positive derivative is a common feature of standard distributions.
10B Proof of Proposition 2







































: this contradicts (24).
Let us next turn to the monopolistic case. Setting the hazard rate
equal to zero, i.e., h
￿￿ ￿;0
￿
= 0 8￿ ￿; gives the trigger points under opti-




1+m; and under all-equity ￿nancing, i.e., ￿ ￿E =
￿1





















￿ ￿E : (26)
Using (24) and (26) we thus obtain (7). This proves Proposition 2.￿
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